




Briefing Note  
Medium-run wealth inequality following COVID-19 
 
Overview 
To study the wealth inequality implications of the 
recession resulting from COVID-19, we use a model 
with heterogeneous households who choose wealth 
accumulation subject to idiosyncratic shocks to their 
income. We focus on households whose head is of 
working age, variation in labour income post-policy 
(i.e. net of taxes and including benefits), and on 
wealth accumulation in terms of net worth (i.e. net 
financial plus net housing wealth). We examine 
inequality between and within four socioeconomic 
groups, generated by aggregating the NS-SEC 
categories (see Appendix): Professional, 
Intermediate, Routine, and Inactive (including 
unemployed). Households are allocated to a 
socioeconomic group based on the highest category 
within a couple. The model is calibrated to match 
key properties of post-policy labour income with 
respect to these socioeconomic groups in the pre-
COVID-19 economy, and its predictions are 
consistent with key patterns of wealth inequality 
between and within these groups prior to the 
recession. It predicts that, following the COVID-19 
induced recession, adverse changes in income and 
income risk, alongside reductions in consumption 
resulting from restrictions on economic activity, will 
increase wealth inequality, predominantly via a 
negative effect on households in routine and 
intermediate groups. 
 
Income and wealth pre-COVID-19 
We summarise in Table 1 important empirical 
properties of inequality in household labour income 
(post-policy) and wealth for the period 2009-2019 
(details of data provided in the Appendix). Using 
data from Understanding Society (UnSoc) for the 
UK, we summarise mean labour income (post-
policy) per group, and its distribution within each 
group. We also use data from the Wealth and 
Assets Survey (WAS) to calculate similar statistics 
for household net worth for Great Britain. Table 1  
 
shows that socioeconomic groups with higher mean 
labour income (post-policy) also have higher mean 
wealth and lower variation in wealth. 
Table 1: Income and wealth inequality in the UK pre-
COVID-19 









Professional 1.58	 0.24	 1.91	 0.60	 6.7	
Intermediate 1.08	 0.27	 1.08	 0.66	 14.1	
Routine 0.76	 0.24	 0.37	 0.81	 31.1	
Inactive 0.46	 0.30	 0.24	 1.00	 47.5	
All households 
combined 
1	 0.32	 1	 0.71	 18.9	
Source: Understanding Society (waves 1-9) UK, Wealth and Assets 
Survey (waves 1-5), Great Britain; own calculations. Income and 
wealth are measured at the household level. Income is labour 
income minus taxes plus transfers, and wealth is net worth. Means 
are relative to the average for all households. See Appendix for 
details. 
Figure 1 shows the social mobility matrix, which 
demonstrates low rates of transition between 
groups. There is also persistence in households’ 
relative income position within each group, as 
depicted in the more detailed transition matrix in 
Appendix Figure 1.i 
 
Model 
We employ a model in which households receive 
idiosyncratic shocks to their labour income so that 
wealth accumulation is a decision that reflects a 
household’s experience of these shocks. This group 
of models, drawing on and extending the seminal 
contributions of Bewley (1986), Imrohoroglu (1989), 
Huggett (1993) and Aiyagari (1994), is the standard 
methodological tool to analyse wealth inequality 
quantitatively (e.g. Krueger et al. (2016) for a 
review, and Angelopoulos et al. (2019, 2020) for 
examples focusing on the UK).	
 
COVID-19 has led to a severe economic recession. We examine its potential medium-run effects on 
household-level wealth inequality in the UK. We use modelling analysis to study short and long 
recession scenarios. In the short recession scenario, there is a significant increase in wealth 
inequality characterised by a combination of a decrease in wealth accumulation for economically 
active households with lower income, an increase in wealth accumulation for households with 
higher incomes, and an increase in within-group inequality. In the long recession scenario, a 
worsening of the income and employment effects of the recession and a slower recovery lead to 
particularly severe wealth losses for economically active households with lower income, giving rise 





Figure 1: Probability of changing socioeconomic group 
	
Source: Understanding Society (waves 1-9), own calculations. 
P=Professional, I=Intermediate, R=Routine, IN=Inactive. Entries 
denote the proportion of households that remain in the same or 
move to another socioeconomic group from one year to the next. 
In the version of the model employed here, 
household labour income (modelled post-policy) 
depends on the profession associated with 
household socioeconomic group, itself a stochastic 
process that follows the transition matrix in Figure 1, 
and on further group-dependent shocks. We 
calibrate the model so that household labour income 
in the pre-COVID-19 economy is determined by the 
stochastic process corresponding to the matrix in 
Appendix Figure 1. Total household income is 
comprised of labour income and income from assets 
minus debt repayments. Given the stochastic 
process for labour income, and the return to assetsii, 
households allocate their income to consumption 
and savings, aiming to maximise their utility over 
time. iii  The model generates a stationary iv 
distribution of wealth with properties for inequality 
between and within the socioeconomic groups (see 
Appendix Table 1) that are consistent with the 
patterns observed in Table 1.v 
 
Recession scenarios 
We obtain the dynamic path for the cross-sectional 
distribution of wealth, starting from the stationary 
equilibrium, as a result of changes due to the 
COVID-19 recession. These changes affect mean 
labour income and income risk per group, as well as 
the possibility for consumption.vi  We consider two 
scenarios that differ in relation to the magnitude, 
form, and length of the changes.vii 
 
In the first scenario, that of a short recession as a 
result of COVID-19, we incorporate the following 
effects compared with the pre-COVID-19 economy: 
(i) an increase in income risk approximated by a 
reduction in the job-finding rate for inactive 
households and an increase in the job separation 
rate for households in the intermediate and routine 
groups, reflected in the transition probability for 
households in these groups to the inactive group 
(which includes unemployed in the model), of 
1.33%, in 2020, with a further reduction/increase to 
3.99% in 2021viii; (ii) a drop in the mean level of 
labour income for 2020 and 2021ix, of 3.75% for the 
professional group, 7.5% for the intermediate and 
11.25% for routine; (iii) an upper bound in 
consumption, lasting for two years, reflecting 
restrictions in activity associated with lockdown 
measures and the resulting reduced possibility for 
consumptionx, set at the consumption of the 70th 
percentile of the pre-COVID-19 distribution of 
consumption.xi We further assume that post-2021, 
the economy will recover relatively quickly so that 
employment and labour income per group 
effectively return to their pre-COVID-19 values in 
three years.xii  
 
In the second scenario, we consider the effects of a 
longer, deeper recession, which differs from the 
short recession scenario in two ways. First, the 
increase in employment risk and the reduction in 
mean labour income in 2021 are double those of the 
short recession scenario. Second, the recovery 
period, after 2022, lasts longer.xiii In particular, while 
job finding and separation probabilities return to the 
pre-COVID-19 levels in 2022, it takes longer for 
labour income and employment shares to return to 
pre-COVID-19 levels.xiv 
 
Findings: wealth inequality in the medium run 
We plot in Figure 2 the time evolution of statistics 
describing the distribution of wealth for the whole 
economy, under the two recession scenarios. 
Regarding mean household wealth, we observe an 
initial increase, consistent with the increases in 
savings documented in empirical research for 2020 
(e.g. Hacioglu et al. (2020) and ONS (2020)). 
However, this increase is short-lived, and followed 
by a large subsequent reduction in the long 
recession scenario. Comparison with Appendix 
Figure 2, showing results without consumption 
restrictions, reveals that the initial decrease is driven 
by the restrictions on consumption during 2020 and 
2021. xv  
 
Regarding wealth inequality, we observe large 
increases. There is an increase in the Gini index, 
which is substantial, even under the short recession 
scenario. To contextualise the scale of these 
increases – about 4 Gini points under the short 
recession and 9 points under the long recession 
scenario – we calculate that the Gini increased by 
4.5 points following the 2008 recession (between 
2007 and 2013).xvi Figure 2 shows that the increase 
in Gini is due to both a decrease in relative wealth 







the upper quintile. The restrictions in consumption 
contribute to the increase in Gini in the short 
recession scenario (compare Figure 2 to Appendix 
Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2: Model predictions for mean wealth and 
inequality post-COVID-19. 
	
Note: The short recession scenario implies a drop in mean income 
and an increase in unemployment during 2020 and 2021, and 
growth in income after 2021 that takes income levels per group to 
pre-COVID-19 levels by 2024. The job finding rate is 50% above 
pre-COVID-19 levels in 2022-23. The long recession implies the 
same shock in 2020, but twice as large a drop in mean income and 
twice as large an increase in unemployment in 2021. In this 
scenario, incomes return to pre-COVID-19 levels by 2027. See 
‘Recession scenarios’ in the text and the Appendix for more details. 
	
We further show, in Figure 3, wealth inequality 
between and within socioeconomic groups. 
Focusing on the three groups of professional, 
intermediate and routine, we note that wealth 
inequality (Gini) increases within groups, reflecting 
the increase in risk and the reduction in mean 
labour income. Moreover, inequality between 
groups also increases, because on average the 
group of professional households increase their 
savings, and the groups that are more exposed to 
the shock (i.e. routine and intermediate) decrease 
their wealth. Under the short recession scenario, the 
increases in savings of the higher income group due 
to consumption restrictions contribute to the 
increase in inequality. This is confirmed by 
comparing Figure 3 with Appendix Figure 3, which 
plots the model predictions without imposing the 
upper bound in consumption, revealing that this is 
indeed driving the increase in wealth for the 
professional group. However, under the long 
recession scenario, the increase in between-group 
wealth inequality is driven by a reduction of average 
wealth for households in the intermediate and 
routine groups. Indeed, as Appendix Figure 3 
confirms, the effect of the lockdown-induced 
restrictions on consumption on inequality is 
quantitatively smaller in this case.  
Figure 3: Model predictions for wealth inequality post-
COVID-19, between and within socioeconomic groups. 
	
Note: See notes in Figure 2 
 
For the intermediate and routine groups, the drop in 
mean wealth, combined with the increase in within-
group inequality, imply significant wealth losses for 
a large proportion of households in these groups. To 
illustrate this, we first plot in Figure 4 the change in 
wealth for the median household in each group, 
relative to pre-COVID-19, and find substantial 
reductions, which are dramatic under the long 
recession. To show effects on the left tail of the 
wealth distribution, we also plot the proportion of 
households with negative assets (see Figure 5), 
demonstrating a substantial increase in the share of 
households without positive wealth.  
 
Regarding the inactive group, we observe an 
increase in mean wealth, and a reduction in wealth 
inequality. This reflects a combination of assuming 
that there will be no reduction in the (non-market) 
income for this group, and of the positive wealth 
effects coming from those who join this group from 
the remaining groups, as they become unemployed 
due to the recession.  
 
To demonstrate the changes excluding those who 
would have entered from other groups, we show in 
Appendix Figure 4 the effects for the inactive group 
relative to a counterfactual where the statistics are 
calculated using the population shares pre-COVID-
19.xvii The positive effects are absent, demonstrating 
that there is limited change for households in this 
group when the better initial conditions of the new 






Figure 4: Model predictions for relative median wealth by 
socioeconomic group post-COVID-19.	
	
Note: See notes in Figure 2 
 
Figure 5: Model predictions for share of indebted 
households post-COVID-19 by socioeconomic group. 
	
Note: Share of households in each group that have zero or below 
zero wealth. For further information, see note, Figure 2. 
 
Discussion 
Overall, we find large increases in wealth inequality, 
with substantial reductions in wealth for households 
in the intermediate and routine groups. Even in the 
short recession scenario, overall, the impact on the 
Gini for the whole population is of the same order of 
magnitude as after the 2008 recession. The short 
recession scenario, both in terms of magnitude of 
effects and duration, is likely to be optimistic, 
because the estimates we used to calibrate the 
changes were obtained prior to the deterioration at 
the end of 2020. Thus, the rise in wealth inequality 
predicted under this short recession scenario is 
probably conservative. Nonetheless, there are also 
factors that could prevent a large increase in 
inequality, including very strong income growth or 
redistributive policy in the next few years. Indeed, to 
fully account for changes in inequality following the 
recession, we need to add to the recessionary 
effects included in this analysis the effects of the 
expected rise in taxation. A rise in tax revenue is 
expected to be required to finance the government 
deficits, resulting in reductions in household income 
that can have important inequality implications, 
depending on the policy chosen. More generally, the 
magnitude, form and duration of effects in the 
medium run depend on conditions that are 
amenable to economic policy. The large wealth 
inequality effects we find here highlight the need to 
examine the distributional effects of policy in terms 
of wealth and income inequality, especially given 
their links with health inequality that has already 
worsened as a result of the pandemic and the 
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Understanding Society (ISER, 2020) is a large 
longitudinal survey which follows approximately 
40,000 households (at Wave 1) in the UK. The 
survey covers a wide range of social, economic and 
behavioural factors making it relevant to a wide 
range of researchers and policymakers. Data 
collection for each wave takes place over a 24-
month period and the first wave occurred between 
January 2009 and January 2011. Note that the 
periods of waves overlap, but the individual 
respondents are interviewed around the same time 
each year.  
 
From each household, we retain the head of the 
household, and their partner (married or otherwise) 
if applicable. We drop all households where the 
household head is not of working age (25 to 60); the 
head is in full-time education such as university, 
apprenticeships or government training; those who 
are working unpaid in a family businesses; and 
households with missing or inconsistent information 
in key variables. 
 
Household labour income post-policy is defined as 
net labour income (after taxes) plus miscellaneous 
income, and private and social benefit income. 
Monthly values are transformed into yearly figures. 
To obtain household-level income, we sum over the 
household head and their spouse. 
 
In assigning a social group to a household we 
choose the highest social group between the 
household head and their spouse. Our social group 
variable is derived from the NS-SEC 8-digit 
classification. We group “Large Employers and 
higher Management” (NS-SEC-8 I) together with 
“Higher Professionals” (NS-SEC-8 II) to form our 
group of “Professionals”. Then we group “Lower 
management & Professional” (NS-SEC III), 
“Intermediate” (NS-SEC IV) and “Small employers & 
own account workers” (NS-SEC V) into our group of 
“Intermediate”. “Lower supervisory & technical 
occupations” (NS-SEC VI), “Semi-routine” (NS-SEC 
VII) and “Routine Occupations” (NS-SEC VIII) form 
our group of “Routine”. Finally, we group 
households where neither head nor spouse has 







Wealth and Assets Survey 
 
The Wealth and Assets Survey (ONS, 2018) is a 
longitudinal survey for Great Britain reporting 
information on asset ownership, savings and debt, 
over five waves between 2006 and 2016. We follow 
similar steps as in the sample selection for 
Understanding Society. We calculate household 
level net worth as the sum of net financial wealth 
plus net housing wealth. Net financial wealth is the 
total of financial assets minus total insecure debt or 
nonmortgage borrowing, while net housing wealth is 
the value of all property wealth minus the value of 
property debt. 
 
II. Additional results 
 
Appendix Table 1: Model predictions, income and wealth 
inequality pre-COVID-19. 









Professional 1.49 0.19 1.92 0.44 6.5 
Intermediate 1.04 0.21 1.01 0.54 15.4 
Routine 0.72 0.19 0.45 0.71 30.4 
Inactive 0.48 0.22 0.29 0.87 37.5 
All households 
combined 
1 0.27 1 0.61 19.0 
 
Appendix Figure 1: Social mobility matrix, 
socioeconomic groups  and earnings subgroups. 
	
Note: Source: UnSoc (wave 1-9), own calculations. P=Professional, 








Appendix Figure 2: Model predictions for mean wealth 
and inequality post-COVID-19 without the restriction on 
consumption. 
 
Note: See note, Figure 2. 
Appendix Figure 3: Model predictions for mean wealth 
and inequality post-COVID-19 by socioeconomic group, 
without restriction on consumption. 
	
Note: See note, Figure 2. 
Appendix Figure 4:  Counterfactual evaluation of wealth 
post-COVID-19 for the group of economically inactive. 
	
Note: Model prediction denotes the evolution of mean wealth for the 
group of inactive as predicted by the model (see e.g. Figure 2 in the 
main text). In the counterfactual, the group level distribution is held 
constant in its pre-COVID-19 state, thereby removing the effect of 
changes in the composition of the group of inactive households and 
thereby neutralizing the effect of an increase of households with high 
wealth joining the group after the shock. For further information, see 
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i	To approximate within group earnings risk, we work 
as follows. We first purge several observable 
characteristics from household-level labour income 
post-policy, by running a Mincerian regression of a 
set of demographic variables on the natural 
logarithm of income. Our regression specification 
includes the sex of the head of the household, a 
social group dummy, a third order polynomial of 
age, an indicator of the regional location of the 
household, and the natural logarithm of household 
size. We obtain the residuals and re-centre them 
around the group specific mean. We then split each 
social group into 3 subgroups along the 30th and 
70th income percentile. Using these 3 sub-
categories, together with the 4 socioeconomic 
groups, we obtain the 12-by-12 transition matrix, as 
well as the group-earnings state specific income 
levels. 
ii  The interest rate is set exogenously and 
maintained fixed in our analysis, at the very low pre- 
COVID-19 value of 0.56%, reflecting empirical 
evidence that interest rates have remained very low 
following pandemics (see e.g. Jordà et al. (2020)). 
As an ad-hoc risk premium, we double the interest 
rate, payable by households, who are in debt. 
iii	The objective function of the households is given 
by the discounted present value of the stream of 
utilities from consumption over time.	
iv	We choose the following functional form for the 
utility function: with . The model is 
calibrated at an annual frequency and hence the 
discount factor is set to 0.96, which is in the range 
of common values for the UK (see e.g. Faccini et al. 
2013). We set the borrowing limit to match the share 
of households with zero wealth from the WAS (19%) 
in the stationary equilibrium. We solve the 
household’s problem with Value Function Iteration, 
on a grid with 500 points with more points close to 
the borrowing limit, using a 7th order polynomial 
approximation of the value function. Using a 
piecewise polynomial approximation method 
instead, gives qualitatively similar results at the cost 
of higher computation time. Due to the nonlinearities 
introduced by the consumption ceiling during the 
lockdown and the differential interest rate of 
borrowing, we do not rely on Euler based solution 
methods. 	
v	Overall, the model under-predicts wealth inequality 
by an amount that is in line with the existing studies 
(see e.g. Krueger et al. (2016), and, for the UK, 
Angelopoulos et al. (2019, 2020)), because it 
misses quantitatively the extent of wealth inequality 
resulting from the upper tail, especially at the top 
1% and 5% of wealth. We do not focus on the right 
tail, i.e. the super wealthy, in this analysis, but 
instead on income inequality along the remaining 
																																								 																																								 																							
distribution, and on comparisons between social 
groups. The model is also good at capturing the 
variation in indebtedness between the 
socioeconomic groups, which is a useful measure of 
the left tail of the wealth distribution. Although we 
have calibrated the model to match the overall 
share of the households in debt (19%), the 
predictions of the model with respect to this 
proportion in each groups are free, and can be seen 
in Appendix Table 1. The stationary equilibrium 
predictions cohere with the between group variation 
we see in the data. 
vi	See e.g. Huggett (1997) and Boppart et al. 2018 
on computational methods to obtain such dynamic 
paths.	
vii	In each of these cases, the households are given, 
in the period of the shock, i.e. in 2020, the time 
paths for the aggregate quantities, i.e. for the 
interest rate, group-level mean disposable income, 
and for the transition matrix. However, although they 
know the aggregate environment, they are uncertain 
about their own future disposable income, as this is 
subject to the idiosyncratic shocks that are 
determined by the conditional probabilities encoded 
in the transition matrix.	
viii 	This is motivated by the analysis in Nabarro 
(2020) that estimates unemployment to be around 
8% in early 2021, which implies an approximate 
doubling from the pre-crisis state. Since 
approximately 30% of inactive households are 
unemployed, we calibrate the transition matrices to 
match the 30% increase by year two, while 
assuming that 1/3 of this increase happens in the 
first year of the crisis. We exclude the professional 
group from the increased unemployment risk, since 
many of the typical occupations among this group 
are unlikely to be very affected by the crisis (for 
example, they can more easily work remotely).	
ix	The reduction in disposable income is based on 
data presented in Marmot (2020) Figure 5.12. The 
analysis therein suggests that real median 
household earnings have fallen around 15% for 
households in the lowest household income quintile, 
and about 5% for all other quintiles, between 
January and May 2020. Our estimates for the 
income reductions are thereby based on half-year 
figures. Assuming a partial recovery over the 
second half of 2020, we benchmark our labour 
income drops on ¾ of the drops described in 
Marmot (2020). This is likely an optimistic approach, 
as the worsening of conditions in the winter months 
of 2020 showed. The conservative estimate of 
income loss in effect implies that our results likely 
provide a lower bound on increase in wealth 
inequality (see also Discussion). Focusing only on 
those households with labour market attachment, 






to the group of Routine households, as they are 
most likely to be represented by the bottom quintile 
of working households. For the Professional group, 
we base a 3.75% reduction on the 5% reported 
drop. Since the group of Intermediate includes a 
number of small business owners, who are likely to 
have suffered during the COVID-19 restrictions, we 
locate them halfway between the other two groups 
(drop of 7.5%). The true income loss is likely to be 
higher, especially for self-employed, but also for 
salaried workers who may face decreased 
promotion prospects or bonuses. 
x A significant reduction in consumption, implying an 
increase in savings, especially for the higher income 
groups due to lockdown measures has been 
observed in the data (see e.g. Hacioglu et al. 
(2020)). The upper bound in our analysis is 
motivated by evidence in Bank of England (2020) 
showing that roughly 30% of the households have 
reduced their consumption relative to pre-COVID-
19. 
xi  See also e.g. Benassy (2005) for models with 
restrictions in consumption. Note that in the 
Appendix we show the model predictions without 
the upper bound in consumption. 
xii  The short recession scenario presupposes that 
growth starts at the beginning of year 3 (2022) after 
the shock and is linear (“V-shaped”), so that 1/3 of 
the distance between net earnings at the trough in 
year 2 (2021) and the full recovery is covered in 
each year 3 and 4 and full recovery is achieved in 
year 5 (2024). Additionally, the job finding rate is 
increased by 50% relative to its baseline value in 
years 3 & 4. See e.g. OBR (2020, chart 1.5) for 
estimates of a recovery of the economy by 2024-
2025. 
xiii Krueger et al. (2016) calculate a length of five 
years for a typical large recession in the US (see 
also Coulter (2016) for a treatment of the 2008 
recession in the UK). 
xiv The long recession scenario, supposes a slower 
(“U-shaped”) recovery where disposable incomes 
after year 2 evolve according to the following 
dynamic equation:  
Accordingly, all earnings reach their pre COVID-19 
values by year 8 after the shock (2027). 
xv Some of the increase in mean wealth in Figure 2 
reflects precautionary incentives, since households 
anticipate after 2020 the worsening of economic 
conditions in 2021, before the recovery starts. 
However, as Figure 2 in the Appendix shows, the 
impact of lockdown effects via consumption is 
predominant, and precautionary effects on their own 
only increase mean wealth under the long recession 
scenario, and by a small proportion. Similar 
precautionary behaviour is seen also in the analysis 
of savings by group under the long recession. 
																																								 																																								 																							
xvi The increase in Gini between 2007 and 2013 is 
based on the WAS data.  
xvii  In particular, we use the conditional distribution 
function for Inactive in the stationary equilibrium, 
which reflects the pre-COVID-19 proportions of 
households in each wealth outcome, and the policy 
functions for the inactive households post-COVID-
19. 
xviii  The very small changes observed reflect the 
change in risk associated with the change in the job 
finding probability and the decreased returns 
associated with finding a job (due to the reduction in 
labour income for other groups). 
